Investigations stop at human error
Naming the person closest to the event feels like a finding. It is where the analysis should start, not finish — the template structures the layers underneath it.
The document that turns a reported event into a defensible finding — structured causal analysis, corrective actions ranked against the hierarchy of control, and a due-diligence trail an officer can stand behind.
Instant download · Editable .docx
An investigation that stops at "worker did not follow procedure" has found a person, not a cause. It produces a corrective action at the bottom of the hierarchy of control — retraining, a reminder, a toolbox talk — and the same event recurs. This template forces the analysis past the immediate act into the conditions that allowed it, then requires each corrective action to be placed on the GRWM Regulation 6 hierarchy so that administrative fixes have to be justified rather than defaulted to.
Naming the person closest to the event feels like a finding. It is where the analysis should start, not finish — the template structures the layers underneath it.
Regulation 6 requires elimination first, then substitution, isolation and engineering, before administrative controls and PPE. Every action in this report has to declare its level.
Section 44 puts a personal duty on officers to verify that resources and processes are in place and used. A completed investigation file, with actions closed out and verified, is a large part of how that duty is evidenced.
This is the investigation. The initial report and the WorkSafe notification decision are handled by the reporting form.
Word — 16 pages (report + analysis tools + guidance) · Formats: DOCX
Investigation is not itself a named statutory document in New Zealand. Its legal weight comes from the duties it discharges — the primary duty of care, the officer due-diligence duty, and the requirement that control measures actually remain effective.
Written and reviewed by the occupational health and safety team at OH Consultant. The layered causal structure draws on established incident-analysis practice — absent or failed defences, individual and team actions, task and environmental conditions, organisational factors — adapted to New Zealand duty-holder language under HSWA 2015 rather than reproduced from an Australian or offshore model.